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Abstract
Mentalizing, conventionally defined as the process in which we infer the inner thoughts and 
intentions of others, is a fundamental component of human social cognition. Yet its role, and 
the nuanced layers involved, in real world social interaction are rarely discussed. To account 
for this lack of theory, we propose the Interactive Mentalizing Theory (IMT). We discuss the 
connection between mentalizing, metacognition, and social interaction in the context of four 
elements of  mentalizing:  (i)  Metacognition -  inference of  our own thought processes and 
social cognitions and which is central to all other components of mentalizing including: (ii) 
first-order  mentalizing  –  inferring  the  thoughts  and  intentions  of  an  agent’s  mind;  (iii) 
personal second-order mentalizing - inference of other’s mentalizing of one’s own mind;  (iv) 
Collective mentalizing: which takes at least two forms (a) vicarious mentalizing: adopting 
another’s mentalizing of an agent (i.e. what we think others think of an agent) and (b) co-
mentalizing: mentalizing about an agent in conjunction with others’ mentalizing of that agent 
(i.e. conforming to others beliefs about another agent’s internal states).  The weights of these 
four  elements  is  determined  by  metacognitive  insight  and  confidence  in  one’s  own  or 
another’s  mentalizing  ability,  yielding  a  dynamic  interaction  between  these  circuits.  To 
advance our knowledge on mentalizing during live social interaction, we identify how these 
subprocesses  can  be  organized  by  different  target  agents  and  facilitated  by  combining 
computational modeling and interactive brain approaches.




Niccolo  Machaivelli  was,  perhaps,  the  first  to  introduce  the  concept  of  understanding 
another’s mind, stating in his 1513 book The Prince “Minds are of three kinds: one is capable 
of thinking for itself; another is able to understand the thinking of others; and a third can 
neither think for itself nor understand the thinking of others.” Three centuries later, Charles 
Darwin spoke of his father’s remarkable ability to read the character of others and “even the 
thoughts of those whom he saw even for a short period of time.” Machaivelli and Darwin’s 
prescient insights capture the idea that we have evolved a system to gain access to others’ 
inner thoughts. In modern psychology, this system is referred to as mentalizing or the process 
by which we infer the content of the thoughts of others (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; 
Frith & Frith, 1999). The process of mentalizing occurs when we believe that something has a 
mind (Gray, Gray, & Wegner, 2007) or when we project a mind into a mindless object (e.g. 
anthropomorphism).  Whether we are right or wrong, mentalizing is the process of theorizing 
about a target agent’s inner beliefs and allows us to imbue goals and expectations onto others. 
Dynamic aspects of social information are often combined to infer another agent’s belief or 
attitude,  either  from  their  tone  of  voice,  facial  expressions,  body  postures,  or  some 
combination thereof (Bögels, Barr, Garrod, & Kessler, 2014; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Hagan 
et al., 2013). To understand another person’s thought processes, the agent needs to retrieve, 
enquire  about,  or  infer  their  experiences.  Together  these  provide the  context  that  enables 
insight into the encoder’s mind. The process by which this occurs is critical as it refines the 
receiver’s interpretation of social signals, leading to a better understanding of others, which is 
vital for successful social interaction.  This understanding is generated through perspective 
taking, simulations, active learning, and predictions that are dynamically updated (Silston, 
Basset and Mobbs, 2018). 
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Here, we propose an Interactive Mentalizing Theory (IMT), where mentalizing is divided into 
the following four components: 1) metacognition or insights and confidence about one’s own 
thought processes and cognition. This sets the foundation to all other mentalizing processes. 
2)   first-order  mentalizing  -  mentalizing  about  an  agent’s  mind  3)  personal  second-order 
mentalizing  -  inference  of  other’s  mentalizing  of  one’s  own  mind,  and  4)  collective 
mentalizing: vicarious mentalizing adopting another’s mentalizing of minds of other agents, 
and co-mentalizing or weighted second-order mentalizing,  which usually occurs when we 
believe  that  others  have  better  insights  than  do  we  into  the  thoughts  of  relevant  agents. 
Metacognitive insight  and confidence about  one’s  own mentalizing ability  determines  the 
weights  ascribed to  all  four  elements  of  the  IMT.  These  four  elements  of  the  IMT have 
overlapping neuronal ensembles, where population codes integrate to form a coherent picture 
of others’ thoughts and intentions.
2. Metacognition and Mentalizing
A key  element  of  our  model  is  that  the  aforementioned  components  of  mentalizing  are 
influenced  by  metacognitive  processes.  Metacognition  refers  to  second  order  cognitions 
including thoughts, knowledge, or beliefs about one’s thoughts or thought processes (Flavell, 
1979;  Metcalfe  &  Shimamura,  1994;  Nelson,  1990).  Broadly  speaking,  metacognition 
includes knowledge or self-awareness about beliefs, mental-states, motivations, intentions and 
abilities,  as well  as the ability to consciously and deliberately monitor and regulate these 
aspects  (Flavell,  1979).  Various  aspects  of  metacognition include meta-level  abilities  that 
evaluate and control different cognitive processes. One noteworthy bias is that people often 
believe themselves to be less susceptible to biasing influences than others (Pronin & Kugler, 
2007).  
Although  it’s  not  easy  to  quantify  metacognitive   sensitivity  or  metacognitive  accuracy, 
attempts have been made to do this  (Fleming & Lau,  2014).   For example,  studies have 
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utilized signal detection theory to compute a “response-specific” meta-dʹ  and ROC Curves to 
measure metacognitive sensibility (Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010; Maniscalco & 
Lau, 2014). A reliable index is metacognitive accuracy, the correlation between subjective 
confidence and the actual performance. Indeed, subjective levels of confidence is a common 
metric for assessing metacognitive estimates of accuracy (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996).  As one 
of the most essential dimensions of metacognition, confidence refers to people’s subjective 
beliefs about the validity of their thoughts and judgments, irrespective of objective accuracy 
measures.
During social interaction, an online metacognitive process takes place at a first-order level, 
second-order level, or group/collective level (Bahrami et al., 2012; MMahmoodi et al., 2013). 
Social interaction influences the way in which these metacognitive processes are updated or 
confirmed,  either  through  experiences  such  as  social  acceptance  or  rejection,  or  social 
feedback or  persuasion (Petty,  Briñol,  &Tormala,  2002).  Metacognition also regulates  the 
subjective social experience, during social learning and social interaction. The representation 
of one’s own social competence might drive others to perceive him/her in a similar vein, 
encouraging an alignment of behavior. For instance, levels of confidence projected during an 
interactive  negotiation  or  business  transaction  may  largely  determine  the  economic  gain 
(Charness, Rustichini, & van de Ven, 2018). 
Throughout this article, we will focus on metacognition as part of the ‘global mentalizing 
system’, which we believe plays a major role in social inference in interaction. Over the past 
few decades,  there  was  a  gap  between  metacognition  and  mentalizing,  as  metacognition 
mainly pertains to one’s own mind and mentalizing involves inferences about another agent’s 
mind. Theoretical models that link metacognition with mentalizing propose that mentalizing 
is  a  knowledge-oriented  dimension  of  metacognition  (Efklides  & Misailidi,  2010;  Kuhn, 
2000).  Different aspects of social  interaction presumably involve metacognition: 1) social 
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judgment (Petty, Briñol, Tormala, & Wegener, 2007), for example, metacognition in attitude 
change (the confidence in old and new attitudes after exposure to persuasive information) 
(Tormala & Petty, 2004; Rollwage, Dolan & Fleming, 2018); 2) representation of the social 
knowledge  or  beliefs  of  others  (see  review  Frith,  2012),  3)  together  with  mentalizing, 
switching the i-mode and we-mode for joint action (Tuomela, 2006) or collective decisions 
with confidence sharing between individuals (Bahrami et al., 2010; Mahmoodi et al., 2013; 
Marshall, Brown, & Radford, 2017; Stasser & Titus, 1985). The subjective confidence with 
which  we  assign  a  correct  internal  estimate  to  our  mental  state  inferences  is  crucial  in 
interaction,  although  not  always  explicitly  so.  However,  research  lacks  a  theoretical 
framework that combines metacognition with mentalizing during social interaction. 
3. Mentalizing
Mentalizing  is  the  mental  ability  to  understand other  people’s  behavior  in  terms of  their 
intentions, beliefs, needs, desires, or goals (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). Mentalizing originally 
refers to the attribution of mental states to both others and oneself (Kidd & Castano, 2013; 
Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Zunshine, 2006), and with multiple dimensions such as cognitive 
and  emotional  dimensions  (Choi-Kain  &  Gunderson,  2008;  Fonagy  &  Luyten,  2009). 
Substantial  literature  shows that  by nature,  humans engage in  mentalizing during tactical 
activities such as deception and lie detection (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008), and persuasion 
(Slaughter, Peterson, & Moore, 2013).  Humans also engage in mentalizing during practical 
activities such as teaching and learning (Wang, 2015). Impairments in mentalizing ability has 
been reported in various neuropsychiatric disorders of development, such as autism (Baron-
Cohen,  Leslie,  &  Frith,  1986),  schizophrenia  (see  review  Brüne,  2005),  and  depressive 
disorders (Berecz, Tényi, & Herold, 2016). 
Complex social interactions are cognitively demanding because of the depth or higher-order 
reasoning they require (Hampton, Bossaerts, & O'Doherty, 2008). Usually the zeroth-order of 
!7
mentalizing involves knowledge of some objective facts without necessitating a reasoning 
component; the first-order of mentalizing is the ability to understand that another person can 
have  thoughts  that  are  different  to  our  own  (e.g.  “false”  beliefs);  the  second  order  of 
mentalizing is the ability to understand that two individuals can have different thoughts, one 
of  which  is  in  alignment  with  our  own  thoughts  and  one  of  which  is  not;  advanced 
mentalizing occurs when one is able to infer what one person thinks that another person is 
thinking  (Banerjee,  2002).   While  these  mentalizing  abilities  are  thought  to  develop  in 
individuals  in an orderly fashion,  the entire  process occurs at  different  rates  for  different 
individuals, and is often completed in adolescence (Banerjee, 2002). We refer to mentalizing 
as an imaginative mental activity that involves at least two agents (self and other, or other and 
other) and two aspects (cognitive and affective) (Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008; Fonagy & 
Luyten, 2009). 
4. Personal second-order mentalizing
As one  aspect  of  higher-order  mentalizing,  personal  second-order  mentalizing  is  a  novel 
component that we propose refers to one’s metacognitive insight or confidence about others’ 
mentalizing of one’s inner thoughts to reveal how much insight we think that others have into 
our own inner thoughts and intentions (i.e. does he or she know what I’m thinking?).  As 
people’s thoughts can be oriented to external or internal stimuli including other people, the 
environment, or themselves, personal second-order mentalizing plays a crucial role in social 
interaction. We are specifically interested in mentalizing that involves both metacognitive and 
interpersonal components in social interactions, in which high-level metacognitive processes 
such  as  confidence,  partially  depend  on  the  mentalizing  processes  involved  in  social 
interactions  with  others.  This  higher-order  process  may  or  may  not  be  associated  with 
reflective awareness, but it is nevertheless a metacognitive process. We believe that people 
can have varying degrees of subjective feelings of confidence about others’ insights to one’s 
own  thoughts  or  beliefs.  Personal  second-order  mentalizing  holds  that  people’s  social 
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behavior not only relies on subjective mentalizing abilities but also on their awareness and 
confidence in their own ability to hide their inner motives during social interaction. 
Personal second-order mentalizing is generated through adopting the perspective of another 
agent, simulating their mind, predicting their behaviors, and adjusting one’s confidence based 
upon how well  our prediction matched the observed outcome. For example,  in an online 
interactive dishonesty study, the proposers thought that their opponents had poor insight into 
their own decisions, reported with higher confidence in the task, while responders with the 
higher-confidence in hiding their thought reported lower trust to the proposers (Wu, Fung and 
Mobbs, 2019). Further, the personal second-order mentalizing proposed in our theory is more 
about assessing one’s own abilities -- it is not aimed at objectively discriminating between 
those with poor and good mentalizing abilities. Following from this notion, a related effect of 
metacognitive bias is laid out by Dunning-Kruger (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), and indicates 
that individuals may overestimate their own abilities relative to others (Kruger & Dunning, 
1999; Dunning, 2011; Taylor & Brown, 1988). Taken together, self-evaluation may be biased 
such that we assign a higher rating to one’s own mentalizing capacity, and a lower rating with 
respect to others’ mentalizing capacities.
5.Collective mentalizing: Vicarious mentalizing and co-mentalizing 
Collective mentalizing is when additional agents influence our inferences of a target agent’s 
inner mental states. Vicarious mentalizing is when one conforms to other’s views of an agent. 
This is different from co-mentalizing, which takes into consideration the perceived validity of 
the opinion of the one providing the information. However, vicarious mentalizing and co-
mentalizing both manifest from an interaction with third-party others.  Agents tend to adopt 
their  peers’  or  the  majority  opinion  (e.g.,  beliefs,  choices  and  attitudes)  during  social 
interaction and align their beliefs or decisions under social influence (i.e., social conformity) 
(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Wood, 2000).  Conformity also depends on power dynamics and 
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hierarchies, as one has a tendency to conform to the beliefs and opinions of higher-ranking 
others  (Qi,  Footer,  Camerer,  &  Mobbs,  2018).   Conformity  impacts  many  aspects  of 
cognition. For example, people show memory conformity as they conform to another person's 
memory  (Thorley,  2013),  and  a  subsequent  study  (Wheeler,  Allan,  Tsivilis,  Martin,  & 
Gabbert,  2013)  showed  that  explicit  mentalizing   simulation  biases  memory  conformity 
toward the similar pre-labeled targets. Since social conformity affects many aspects of social 
cognition, we believe that it also plays a key role in mentalizing during social interaction. 
Vicarious mentalizing occurs when we gain insight into a targeted agent’s mind (e.g., A) using 
another agent’s (e.g., B) insight into the targeted agent’s mind. Such a component is critical 
when we need to rely on the opinion of others.  For example, if we barely know Agent A, but 
we know Agent B and we know that Agent B has more experience with Agent A, we can 
summate  that  Agent  B  will  have  better  insights  into  Agent  A’s  thoughts  and  intentions. 
Vicarious  mentalizing,  therefore  interacts  with  the  metacognition  (see  Figure  1). 
Various factors such as the distance or relative position between the self and the target agent 
(A), the intermediary agent (B), adjacency or availability, connectedness, reputation etc., can 
affect  this  component.  This  may lead  to  another  factor  about  the  capacity  to  manipulate 
other’s  inference  towards  oneself  or  another  agent  while  navigating  the  social  world, 
especially in social contexts spanning more than two people. People take longer to perform 
vicarious mentalizing as people may experience both egocentric and allocentric interference 
on  mentalizing,  as  the  ability  to  take  the  perspective  of  the  others  is  affected  by  the 
perspective of oneself. Vicarious mentalizing can lead to emotional arousal, preference, and 
attitude changes. For example, if we think Agent B dislikes agent A, we might also believe 
that there is something bad about agent A (Figure 1). 
Co-mentalizing is built on the notion that humans are motivated to share their inner states 
(beliefs, mental) about and understanding of the social world (see Hardin & Higgins, 1996), 
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which  in  this  case,  refers  to  the  concept  of  co-mentalizing.  Co-mentalizing  can  be  best 
conceptualized  as  co-operative  or  shared  mentalizing  processes  with  one  another.  For 
instance, when professors interview a new graduate student candidate, they tend to form their 
impressions  jointly  with  their  colleagues.  The  convergence  of  mentalizing  leads  to  more 
confidence when people take into account  the (inferred)  inner  states  of  others,  especially 
significant others. Taking the perspective of others, adjusting the communication to a mutual 
understanding,  or  “shared  reality”  (Echterhoff,  Higgins,  &  Levine,  2009),  can  form  and 
maintain social bonds (Hardin and Higgins, 1996). According to the affiliative social tuning 
hypothesis in shared reality, in order to achieve a shared understanding, one is to “tune” their 
views toward the views of the other, with an overarching goal of affiliative motivation toward 
this person. Evidence indicates that humans need to share their inner states (beliefs, goals, 
thoughts, and feelings) and build a shared mind, or common goal, from infancy (see review 
from Liszkowski,  2018) to adults.  In studies of  mothering,  Hrdy (2009) emphasizes how 
attachment and co-operation underpin the evolution of mentalization. 
 
Figure 1. An depiction of the four elements in our Interactive Mentalizing Theory: 1) 
First-order mentalizing: mentalizing of others’ mental states from the perspective of the self 
(i.e., self-other); 2) personal second-order mentalizing/higher-order mentalizing: mentalizing 
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of how much others can mentalize one’s mental states from the perspective of others (i.e., 
other-self); and 3) vicarious mentalizing: mentalizing of other’s mind from the perspective of 
others (i.e., other-other); and, 4) co-mentalizing: mentalizing of another’s mind through others 
in combination with oneself.  Metacognitive processes govern the weights we assign to the 
components within each element. In this figure, the self, A, and B, all could be the mentalizer, 
and people can mentalize other’s thoughts in a direct or vicarious/indirect way. For example, 
the self can infer A’s belief by mentalizing A directly or try to infer B’s mentalizing about A.  
6. The Interactive Mentalizing Theory (IMT)
We  propose  that  four  key  inferential  processes  are  evoked  during  social  interaction: 
metacognition,  first-order  mentalizing,  personal  second-order  mentalizing  and  collective 
mentalizing.  The weight  of  these processes  are  contextually  determined and may rely on 
internal monitoring. Our goal is to describe the multi-layered nature of human mentalizing 
with the influence of metacognitive insight, and enhance our further understanding of social 
navigation  through  vicarious  mentalizing  and  co-mentalizing  skills.  For  example,  during 
social  interaction,  Agent  A has  inferences  about  Agent  B’s  intentions.   Agent  A also has 
beliefs about how much insight Agent B has into their own internal states. Agent A also has 
metacognitive  insight  into  their  own  thought  and  this  is  interpreted  with  high  or  low 
confidence. If the confidence is low, Agent A will look to others (e.g. Agent C) to guide their 
inferences of Agent B. The weight of these four processes alters across contexts and how 
much experience they have with an agent. 
6.1. Relationship between mentalizing and personal second order-mentalizing 
During real time social interaction, how we infer other mental states is impacted by how 
much we think they have insight into ours. In general, mentalizing and personal second order-
mentalizing  should  be  correlated  but  dissociable,  with  the  meta-level  monitoring  and 
controlling of  these two components  dynamically.  According to  simulationists,  our  mind-
reading capacity is an ability to project ourselves based on others’ perspectives, by simulating 
their  mental  states  with  our  own.  Following  this  view,  mentalizing  capacity  would  be 
correlated with the personal second order-mentalizing component. The mentalizing ability, 
however, may not be acquired solely through simulation, and may involve other abilities such 
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as counter-factual thinking, social reasoning, and social learning (see Figure 2). Furthermore, 
due  to  the  Dunning-Kruger  effect,  mentalizing  would  be  negatively  correlated  with  the 
personal second order-mentalizing component, as people who overestimate one’s own ability 
may underestimate others.
6.2. Mentalizing and second order-mentalizing are influenced by metacognition 
In our social  inferential  system, metacognition can be the core ability  that  links people’s 
understanding about others (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). This view is partly supported by 
evidence that better self-reflection correlates with better understanding of others (Dimaggio, 
Lysaker,  Carcione,  Nicolo,  &  Semerari,  2008).   People  can  have  varying  degrees  of 
confidence or certainty about what others are thinking or feeling, but can generate beliefs and 
inferences. Mentalizing is viewed as a tool to predict others’ behaviors and adjust estimates of 
others’ mental states. Similarly, people rarely know others' thoughts about themselves without 
social interaction (low confidence or high uncertainty), but they infer these from dynamic 
social interactions. In this process, people’s inferences originate from a self-generated first 
impression or feeling, and are updated with metacognitive thinking. Inferences that lead to a 
successful interaction will be viewed as a “correct” answer, or a reward signal. 
 
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Figure 2. The box diagram of different inputs of mentalizing in social interaction. The 
core  metacognition  system  receives  inputs  from  one’s  mental  states  from  the  self-other 
perspective, other-other perspective (e.g., inferring other’s mentalization about another agent) 
and other-self  perspective;  2)  People  rely  more  on  the  other-other  perspective  (Vicarious 
mentalizing, or co-mentalizing) when the inputs from self-other perspective and other-self 
perspective  are  insufficient  or  with  low  self-confidence.  C-mt:  confidence  about  the 
mentalizing of the target agent, C-mi: confidence of the mentalizing to the intermediary agent 
(C-mi). 
6.3. Low metacognitive confidence facilitates collective mentalizing 
Within collective mentalizing, one needs to consider the personal level of confidence about 
their ability to mentalize two sources -- the target agent (C-mt) and the intermediary agent (C-
mi). Necessarily, metacognitive confidence will vary upon relational distance, status, in/out 
groups, and adjacency among different agents. For example, one may prioritize inferring the 
target agent’s mind directly if the (C-mt) is larger or equal to the (C-mi), or the distance to the 
both are the same, whereas an indirect/vicarious mentalizing path may be taken if direct path 
is unavailable, or the distance with the target agent is longer. A low level of metacognitive 
confidence will lead one to search for more information and may prompt one to conform to 
what we believe others think about an agent. e.g. I think Agent A has bad intention because I 
don’t know Agent A but Agent B does and Agent B doesn’t trust Agent A.
7. A neural model of the Interactive Mentalizing Theory
Numerous brain regions are known to be involved in mentalizing, and the brain network of 
different components show both areas of convergence and divergence (Figure 3). The medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is a central node in the social brain network and mentalizing, and 
also  plays  a  key  role  in  self-referential  processing  (Mitchell,  Banaji,  &  Macrae,  2005). 
Moreover, mPFC is involved in metacognition, specifically in encoding decision confidence 
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(Bang & Fleming, 2018). Posterior superior temporal sulcus/temporoparietal junction (pSTS/
TPJ) is another key brain region involved in mentalizing (Blakemore, 2008; Frith & Frith, 
2001; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003), with research supported by brain lesion studies (Apperly, 
Samson,  Chiavarino,  &  Humphreys,  2004).  The  pSTS  is  involved  in  social  perception 
(Pelphrey, Morris, & McCarthy, 2004; E. Redcay, 2008; Hagan et al.,  2009; Hagan et al., 
2013) and social attribution (Gao, Scholl, & McCarthy, 2012; Lee, Gao, & McCarthy, 2014; 
Schultz, Imamizu, Kawato, & Frith, 2004). Additionally, the pSTS and temporal lobe more 
generally may be viewed as a hub for integrating and processing signals of emotion for the 
purpose of mentalizing (Hagan et al., 2009; Hagan et al., 2013; Olson, Ploaker, & Ezzyat, 
2007). 
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Figure  3.  Simplified model  of  the  different  neural  networks  involved in  mentalizing 
during social interaction. 1) The core metacognitive neural system receives inputs from both 
first-order and higher-order mentalizing system inputs; 2) anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and 
lateral PFC (lPFC) is a junction for both self and other experience/inference, and also encodes 
prediction errors signal in social learning; 3) metacognitive neural system (mPFC, SPL and 
reward learning brain area like VS and AI) involved in collective mentalizing; 4) when people 
share own mentalizing with others and seek other’s mentalizing, the processes can activate all 
of the four brain systems. The population of cells in these regions create a dynamic social 
wide brain network in different cases of mentalizing (see the right panel, active neurons are 
colored, while inactive ones are gray). 
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Mentalizing produces activity in a system of brain regions, including dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex (dmPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), 
and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) which is more broadly involved in projecting one's self 
outside of the present moment and location (Buckner and Carroll, 2007,  Spreng et al., 2009, 
Zaki  and Ochsner,  2012).  To the extent  that  vicarious,  but  not  personal,  reward involves 
mentalizing, these regions might be engaged preferentially by vicarious reward.
The frontal pole cortex (FPC) is involved in both metacognition via the self-evaluation of 
performance based on feedback and mentalizing (see meta-analysis from Gilbert et al. 2006). 
Evidence indicates that both metacognitive and mentalizing functions are associated with the 
lateral frontal pole activity. The lateral PFC (lPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) are 
activated  in  retrospective  judgments  of  confidence,  which  may  link  to  the  performance 
monitoring  function  (Fleming  &  Dolan,  2012).  Apart  from  PFC,  parietal  cortex  is  also 
involved in subjective confidence. fMRI evidence indicate stronger intraparietal sulcus (IPS) 
or  superior parietal lobule (SPL) activity for decisions associated with lower metacognitive 
confidence  than  higher  metacognitive  confidence  (Chua,  Schacter,  &  Sperling,  2009; 
Hongkeun & Roberto, 2007; Chua, Schacter, Rand-Giovannetti, & Sperling, 2006; Kim & 
Cabeza, 2009).
In our brain model of IMT, the lPFC and ACC receive input regarding the mental states of 
self  and others.  With  access  to  metacognition,  these  two meta-level  regions  monitor  and 
regulate the confidence about mental states. We believe that ACC is a potentially important 
region that integrates distinct forms of social information from various social networks such 
as  social  perception,  motivation,  and  social  prediction.  For  instance,  ACC  supports  the 
detection of matched or mismatched signals between the prediction of another’s intention in a 
competitive  game  (Gallagher,  Jack,  Roepstorff,  &  Frith,  2002).  With  the  signals  from 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) to other mentalizing brain regions, people adaptively 
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adjust  their  inferences  (the  complementary  function  in  metacognition).  According  to  the 
“simulation” and “projection” account, we believe that first-order mentalizing and personal 
second-order mentalizing networks closely interact  with each other.  The personal  second-
order mentalizing component, gets inputs from the first-order mentalizing network, and gives 
output. The medial frontal cortex in the personal second-order mentalizing network is more 
involved in self-referential thinking, while the lateral frontal cortex is involved in higher-
order  and  strategic  thinking.  It  is  noteworthy  that  different  kinds  of  mentalizing  recruit 
distinct brain regions and networks. For instance, STS is primarily involved when people 
infer intentions from movement as it plays a role in biological motion and changeable cue 
processing (Castelli et al., 2000; Schultz et al, 2004; Saxe et al., 2004; Gobbini et al., 2007; 
Haxby et al., 2002), while vmPFC is suggested to activate more strongly during emotional 
mentalizing  (Atique  et  al.,  2011).  There  is  also  stronger  functional  connectivity  between 
vmPFC and the left and right TPJ, than intention mentalizing (Atique et al., 2011).
Vicarious sharing of others' mentalizing often requires an understanding of how other’s value 
a particular agent, especially when observers’ and social targets' opinions diverge. As people 
need to  vicariously learn from others  (Bandura et  al.,  1963)  and,  sometimes,  conform to 
another’s  belief,  we  highlight  two  brain  networks  involved  in  vicarious  mentalizing,  the 
vicarious  learning  network  and  the  conformity  network.  The  vicarious  mentalizing  brain 
largely overlaps with the belief prediction-errors brain (VS and AI) as a function of vicarious 
reinforcement,  or  observational  learning  (Burke  et  al.,  2010).  ACC  plays  a  key  role  in 
encoding  multiple  types  of  prediction  error  signals  and  vicarious  reinforcement  learning 
(Lockwood et al., 2015; Apps et al., 2015, Hill et al., 2016). For example, ACC is involved in 
the learning of fear cues through observation (Olsson, Nearing, & Phelps, 2007).
As for the conformity component, considerable efforts have been made to unveil its neural 
mechanisms (Berns,  Capra,  Moore,  & Noussair,  2010;  Edelson,  Sharot,  Dolan,  & Dudai, 
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2011; Izuma & Adolphs, 2013; Izuma et al.,  2010; see Stallen & Sanfey, 2015; Toelch & 
Dolan,  2015,  for  a  review).  The  majority  of  studies  use  functional  magnetic  resonance 
imaging (fMRI) and experimental paradigms in which participants were exposed to stimuli 
accompanied with another’s choices (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & Welch, 1998), judgments 
(Berns et al.,  2005), ratings (Nook & Zaki, 2015) or advice (Biele, Rieskamp, Krugel,  & 
Heekeren, 2011; Qi et al., 20 18). A meta-analysis of conformity literature showed that pMFC 
activity  can  predict  the  behavioral  change  (conformity)  (Wu,  Luo,  &  Feng,  2016).  It  is 
interesting that the pMFC is also involved in metacognitive judgments associates with lower 
confidence  (see  Figure  3  in  Molenberghs,  Trautwein,  Böckler,  Singer,  & Kanske,  2016). 
Together, the evidence suggests that the key role of pMFC in the dynamics of mentalizing 
includes conformational mentalizing when one’s confidence is low. 
8. The Interactive Mentalizing Theory: implications and future directions 
Our  theory  posits  that  in  addition  to  a  classic  mentalizing  system involved  in  self-other 
interaction, a metacognitive system oversees different types of mentalizing, leading to various 
possible interaction outcomes. Future research can support our theory or test our hypotheses 
through developing tools, testing situations involving social interaction or utilizing different 
demographic samples for evidence of conservation/replication, and computational modeling 
etc. We expect our theory can deepen our understanding of mentalizing deficits in clinical 
samples and will assist in the development of interventions by suggesting improvements in 
both metacognitive and mentalizing capacity.
8.1. The assessment of the components in Interactive Mentalizing Theory. 
One concern about  studying the mentalizing components  is  the methodology,  as  people’s 
inner states are not observable. An important question therefore is whether the components in 
the mentalizing are indeed measurable.  If so, are they then meaningful, and is it feasible to 
predict people’s behavior? In our theoretical framework, the IMT model does not embrace all 
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mentalizing subprocesses. Rather, we aim to capture several aspects of mentalizing in social 
interaction, and thus focus on only four components (mentalizing, metacognition, and second-
order mentalizing, collective mentalizing) (see Figure 1). We believe that these constructs are 
fundamentally  related,  and  shaped  heavily  by  social  interaction,  but  independently 
measurable (e.g. Wu, Fung and Mobbs, 2019). 
8.2. Implication of diverse approaches in interactive mentalizing 
With  the  development  of  social  decision  neuroscience,  an  increasing  number  of  studies 
investigate  mentalizing  during  social  interactions,  with  computational  models  and  tasks 
adapted from game theory. For example, Yoshida et al (2008) adopted ideas from optimal 
control and game theory and provided a computational model for “game theory of mind,” 
using model validation and updating techniques (Yoshida et al., 2008). One group has also 
proposed  a   k-ToM   model,  which  predicts  that  the  performance  of  agents  engaged  in 
competitive  repeated  interactions  increases  with  their  ToM sophistication (Devaine  et  al., 
2014). We call for more efforts in computational models of different dynamic mentalizing 
components within the IMT framework. In order to map the network involved in dynamic 
mentalizing,  we  also  argue  for  a  greater  focus  on  how  different  brain  networks  change 
dynamically  (Silston,  Basset  and  Mobbs,  2018)  given  a  two-person  context,  third-person 
context or even group context (Redcay & Schilbach, 2019; Camerer and Mobbs, 2017).
8.3. Clinical implications of our mentalizing theory 
Research suggests deficits in mentalizing capacity is one of the core features of personality 
disorders and clinical conditions such as autism, psychopathy, and may perhaps underlie the 
emotion labeling deficits  present  in  broad-ranging clinical  conditions  such as  alexithymia 
(Liotti  & Gilbert,  2011;  Lombardo,  Chakrabarti,  Bullmore,  Baron-Cohen,  & Consortium, 
2011; McDonald & Flanagan, 2004). Children with autism are unable to understand others’ 
beliefs in the false belief task, and such mentalizing failures are suggested to lead to impaired 
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social communications (Baron-Cohen et al., 1986). More interestingly, the performance of 
children with autism in a deception task is consistent with that of a false belief task, indicating 
that  mentalizing deficits  may impair  complex social  interaction abilities  (Sodian & Frith, 
1992).  Furthermore,  the  relatively  high  egocentrism,  low  self-reflectivity,  and  impaired 
mindreading  in  Narcissistic  Personality  Disorder  (NPD)  shows  a  link  between  impaired 
ability  to  accurately  label  emotion  within  oneself  and  by  extension  extrapolate  this 
information to others (Dimaggio,  Semerari,  Carcione,  Nicolō,  & Procacci,  2007).  Persons 
with Anorexia Nervosa also have been shown to have higher scores of alexithymia, which 
may partly explain their deficits in social functioning (Taylor et al., 1996). Individuals with 
schizophrenia  show neural  deficits  in  offline and online mentalizing tasks  (Russell  et  al., 
2000,  Brunet  et  al.,  2003,  Andreasen et  al.,  2008,  Walter  et  al.,  2009;  Das et  al.,  2009). 
Furthermore, there is evidence showing an over-interpretation of the mental states of others, 
named “over-mentalizing” may underpin social anxiety disorder (Hezel and McNally, 2014). 
It is unclear, however, whether individuals can use the information gleaned from others in 
order to better understand their own personal feelings. It is therefore imperative to define the 
structure of components of mentalizing and study the heterogeneity of mentalizing deficits 
among the above mentioned clinical samples.
9. Concluding remarks 
Our IMT framework integrates metacognition and mentalizing, and presents the new concepts 
of personal second-order mentalizing, and collective mentalizing. We believe that the four 
proposed elements of interactive mentalizing are important because it presents a theoretical 
framework for how social interactions impact the perception of ourselves, others, and our 
selves  via  others  (e.g.,  reputation  management).  Our  theory  also  provides  a  basis  to 
empirically dissect social conditions that evoke overlapping and distinct mentalizing circuits. 
In turn, this will advance our understanding of the dynamic nature of social interaction and 
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